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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V . 
PHILLIP J. FRANCIS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
.-
CaseNo.20110176-CA 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant responds to the State's arguments in its brief, and contends that the 
State's arguments fail to support the proposition that the church in this case qualified 
as a dwelling under Utah's burglary statute. 
I. UTAH'S BURGLARY STATUTE WOULD NOT 
INCLUDE A CHURCH AS A DWELLING 
The State first claims that defense counsel invited any error when she conceded 
that the legislature might define the church as a dwelling. This claim is erroneous 
because defense counsel never repudiated her argument that the church did not 
constitute a dwelling under the statute. Additionally, the State's arguments supporting 
the claim that the church was a dwelling misread the plain language of the statute and 
misinterpret this Court's cases on the issue. The State's definition of dwelling expands 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
it to the point of nullity to make any structure a dwelling, so long as a person actually 
lives there. 
A. Defense Counsel Did Not Invite the Court to Commit Error 
The State contends that defense counsel conceded that a dwelling would 
constitute a church, and thereby invited any error. Aple's Br. at 9-10. However, this 
argument fails to put the discussion between the court and counsel into proper 
context and neglects to refer to defense counsel's repeated argument to the court that 
the building was not a dwelling. 
First, defense counsel explicitly and repeatedly rejected the concession the State 
claims she made. The entire discussion began when defense counsel indicated the sole 
issue involved "whether or not this church was a dwelling." R. 50:123. The trial court 
indicated that State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) and State v. McNearney, 
2011 UT App 4, 246 P.3d 532 based the analysis on the actual use of the structure, as 
opposed to its traditional use. R. 50:123-25. Defense counsel agreed with the trial 
court's statement that it should interpret the statute to find the building was not a 
dwelling. R. 50:125. Defense counsel then stated that the building's "main use5' was as 
a church—"[i]t is not, you know, classified as a dwelling. Everyone refers to it as a 
church." R. 50:125. She then stated, "Your Honor, I would argue that the actual use of 
that building is a church." R. 50:125. 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The trial court pointed out that church services occurred five to six days a week, 
but that an individual resided in the building seven days a week. R. 50:126. Defense 
counsel then conceded that Ms. Camacho's use of her part of the building was greater 
than that used for church services. R. 50:126. Then, the trial court referred counsel to 
the statute's definition of dwelling and defense counsel stated she thought "the 
legislature under that definition would classify the church as a dwelling." R. 50:127. 
However, immediately after that statement, defense counsel reiterated her argument 
that the church would not constitute a dwelling. 
I don't think we've had case law on this particular issue with these facts as we've 
heard them today, but I would ask the Court to look at the use—the majority of 
the building is used for church services and not for Ms. Camacho. While her 
residence is in the basement, Pastor Narvaez also stated that.. . the majority of 
those rooms are also used for churchgoers. 
R. 50:127-28. 
The invited error doctrine applies only when defense counsel leads the court 
into making an error. 
Our invited error doctrine arises from the principle that a party cannot take 
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error. By precluding appellate review, the doctrine furthers this 
principle by 'discouraging parties from intentionally misleading the trial court 
so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal. ... Thus, encouraging 
counsel to actively participate in all proceedings and to raise any possible error 
at the time of its occurrence fortifies our long-established policy that the trial 
court should have the first opportunity to address a claim of error. 
Pratt v.Nelson, 2007 UT 41, J 17,164 P.3d 366 (quoting State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, 
f 15, 128 P.3d 1171) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
added). Defense counsel must "lead the trial court into making the error." State v. 
Carreno, 2005 UT App 208, 5 11,113 P.3d 1004. See also, State v. Montiel, 2004 UT 
App 242, 5 14,95 P.3d 1216, aff d, 2005 UT 48,122 P.3d 571 ("Here, the State has not 
demonstrated that defense counsel's conduct led the trial court into rejecting the plea 
agreement..."). "Invited error generally occurs in a more affirmative manner, such as 
where counsel stipulates to the court's instruction, states directly that there is no 
objection to a specific ruling of the court, or provides the court with erroneous 
authority upon which the court relies." Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, f 23,164 P.3d 366 
(emphasis added). 
In this case, defense counsel never changed her argument. She never stopped 
arguing that the church did not constitute a dwelling under the statute. She did not 
waive an objection or withdraw her argument. While counsel expressed confusion 
about the legislature's interpretation of the statute and felt that the courts had yet to 
address the issue, she never waived or withdrew her contention that the church did 
not constitute a dwelling. 
In fact, after defense counsel argued the motion and well after the statement the 
State claims operated as a concession of the issue, the court asked, "So let me just 
make sure I'm clear. ... [Y]our ... argument is I should view this as a building rather 
than as a dwelling and—and find that worst case scenario for Mr. Francis this should 
be a third-degree felony rather than a second degree felony; is that right?" R. 50:131. 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defense counsel said, "Yes, Your Honor. That's what I would ask." Id. The State then 
argued the building constituted a dwelling, not a building. R. 50:131-34. Finally, the 
court found that the church met the definition of a dwelling under the statute. R. 
50:144. 
At no point did defense counsel concede that the church constituted a dwelling 
under the statute and the court never treated her statements as waiving that claim. 
Thus, at no point did defense counsel lead the court into committing the error 
Defendant claimed: that it should not have found the church constituted a dwelling 
under the burglary statute. The court had ample opportunity, and in fact did, rule on 
the issue. As the Supreme Court said, the trial court had "the first opportunity to 
address a claim of error." Pratt, 2007 UT 41 at J 17. 
B. The Common Law Supports Enhanced Offenses For Dwellings 
The State contends that the definition of burglary of a dwelling is based solely 
on the criminal code and that the common law has no relevance to the inquiry. Aple's 
Br. at 11-12. Defendant concedes that the relevant inquiry involves a large degree of 
statutory construction. However, the State is incorrect that the common law is 
completely irrelevant to the case at hand. 
"The common law, except as otherwise modified by statute is in force in this 
state." State v. Dean, 69 Utah 268, 254 P. 142,143 (1927). The Utah Supreme Court 
has commented on Utah's common law tradition regarding burglary, stating that "[a]t 
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common law, the societal interests protected from burglary were the sanctity and 
security of occupancy and the dwelling place." State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113,115 (Utah 
1986). 
Defendant did not cite the common law to contend that somehow it abrogated 
the current statute. Rather, he attempted to give a context for why Utah's statute has 
two levels of burglary. Dwelling houses have always been given special protection 
because of the fear of terrorizing occupants. See Aplt's Br. at 7-10. Additionally, the 
common law addressed the question of churches—something that Utah's statute fails 
to mention. If Utah's statute is silent to the issue, the common law continues to 
remain in force. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (West) ("The common law of England 
so far as it is not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the constitution or laws of the 
United States, or the constitution or laws of this state, ... is hereby adopted, and shall 
be the rule of decision in all courts of this state.") At common law, churches were 
limitedly considered dwellings because they were seen to be houses of God, though 
that concept was quickly abandoned. Aplt's Br. at 7-10. And, in fact, the only cases to 
address the issue of whether a church qualifies as a dwelling for purposes of a burglary 
have concluded that they do not. Id. 
Contrary to the State's argument, if the statute is silent about whether a church 
constitutes a dwelling for purposes of a burglary, then courts must look to the 
common law. "Traditionally, the legislature may change the common law only 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
explicitly." OLP, L.L.C. v. Birmingham, 2009 UT 75, J 16, 225 P.3d 177 (quoting 
Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95, f 29, 61 P.3d 989 (Durham, C.J., dissenting)). In fact, 
contrary to the State's assertions, "[i]t is a fundamental principle that while the 
legislature has the authority to abrogate the common law, every instance that a 
statutory scheme and the common law converge does not necessarily mean the 
legislature has abolished the common law." Anderson v. Bell, 2010 UT 47, f 16 n. 5, 
234 P.3d 1147. The common law has extreme relevance because it helps appreciate 
why burglary was gradated and why churches have not been treated as dwellings. 
C. The Statute's Plain Language and this Court's Cases Do Not Support the 
Assertion that Mere Occupancy Converts a Third-Degree Burglary into a 
Second-Degree Burglary, 
The State asserts that "whether a structure is a dwelling under the burglary 
statutes depends on the actual use of the particular structure at issue, not the typical 
use of similar structures." Aple's Br. at 14. This constitutes a fundamental misreading 
of the cases and statute. 
The State reads the statute in an anomalous way to contend that churches 
somehow fit within the definition of "dwellings/5 so long as a person actually lives in 
the church. Aple's Br. at 15-16. The statute defines buildings with its ordinary 
meaning and also includes watercraft, aircraft, trailers, or other buildings "adapted for 
overnight accommodation of persons." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(l)(a) (West). 
Clearly, the church was adapted so that it could accommodate persons staying 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
overnight. Additionally, building includes "each separately secured or occupied 
portion of the structure." Id. at (l)(a)(i). Ms. Camacho's residence, while not typically 
part of a church, was the type of structure that had been "adapted for overnight 
accommodation" and was a separate "occupied portion of the structure." The 
legislature clearly meant to penalize burglary of normal buildings—even those that are 
regularly occupied buildings—as third-degree felonies. 
But the legislature chose to elevate the offense if the building constitutes a 
dwelling. A dwelling is "a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging in 
the building at night, whether or not a person is actually present." Id. at (2). The State 
reads this portion of the statute to mean that if the building itself was "usually 
occupied," then the structure would become a dwelling. Aple's Br. at 16. However, if 
the legislature meant that, it would have said, "'Dwelling' means any building which a 
person usually uses for lodging at night." However, the legislature made the 
enhancement conditioned on the nature of the building itself, not on the nature of 
how it actually is used: a dwelling is "a building which is usually occupied," not a 
"building which a person usually occupies." The difference is critical. 
The State's reasoning has been explicitly contravened by this Court in both 
cases in which it has interpreted this statute. First, Cox specifically holds that the 
typical use of the structure itself is the determinative factor. 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The term "usually occupied" refers to the purpose for which the structure is 
used. If the structure is one in which people typically stay overnight, it fits 
within the definition of dwelling under the burglary statute. 
State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis added). In fact, this 
Court emphasized that it was the nature of certain structures as traditional dwellings 
that merited elevated protection as second-degree felonies: 
Likewise, our second degree burglary statute is intended to protect people while 
in places where they are likely to be living and sleeping overnight, as opposed to 
protecting property in buildings such as stores, business offices, or garages. 
Id. (emphasis added). People are not likely to be living and sleeping overnight in 
churches, stores, offices, or garages. But they are likely to be living and sleeping 
overnight in homes, cabins, condos, and apartment buildings. Thus, Cox's analysis 
hinges on the ordinary or customary use of the building itself. 
In McNearney, the structure itself was one which people traditionally occupy— 
a completed, but never lived in home. State v. McNearney, 2011 UT App 4,246 P.3d 
532. This Court held that the defendant still committed a third degree burglary (and 
not a second degree) because the house had never actually been occupied. Id. at J 9. 
Important to the Court was Cox's focus on '"the purpose for which the structure is 
used,' and whether 'the structure is one in which people typically stay overnight."5 Id. 
(emphasis in original). Since no one had used the home, and since the home was not 
presently occupied, it did not constitute a dwelling under the statute. Id. at f J 10-11. 
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Both cases support the propositions as argued in Mr. Francis's opening brief-
that churches do not constitute dwellings, even if occupied by a person. Aplt's Br. at 
11-16. That is because churches are not structures "in which people typically stay 
overnight." McNearney, 2011 UT App 4 at 5 9. 
In response to defendant's equal protection argument, the State alleges that 
crimes may often be enhanced based on circumstances unaware to the defendant, 
such as rape of a child under age 14. Aple's Br. at 17. However, this argument does not 
address the equal protection concern at issue here. 
A defendant may rape someone unaware of the fact that the child was under 
age 14. However, all defendants who rape children under the age of 14 would receive 
the same charge, whether they knew the child's age or not. In the case of this statute, 
however, two defendants may rob similar structures—a warehouse for example. In 
one case, the defendant would receive a third degree felony. In another, if part of that 
warehouse had a residence for a security guard, that defendant would receive a second 
degree felony. Both defendants committed the same crime and one receives a more 
severe sanction merely because a person happened to live there. "A law does not 
operate uniformly if'persons similarly situated' are not 'treated similarly' ..." Gallivan 
v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, f 37, 54 P.3d 1069 (quoting Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 577 
(Utah 1993). "Both the federal and state constitutions require that similarly situated 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
individuals be treated alike under the law unless there is a reasonable basis for treating 
them differently." State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 368 (Utah 1995). 
Under the State's reading of the statute, the equal protection argument becomes 
a problem. However, under Defendant's reading of the statute, it never becomes an 
issue. If someone burglarizes a structure that typically houses people—homes, condos, 
apartments—then all similarly situated persons receive the same charge, as the statute 
says, "whether or not a person is actually present." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(2). If 
someone burglarizes a structure in which people do not typically sleep—a garage, 
office, or a church—then he would receive a third degree burglary, again regardless of 
whether a person actually sleeps there. 
The State claims that the legislature intended to "protect persons where they 
usually sleep, in any form that sleeping place might take." Aple's Br. at 18. To the 
State, "the actual use of that particular structure" can make a building a dwelling. 
However, under this reading of the statute, the watercraft, aircraft, and other buildings 
"adapted for overnight accommodation of persons," which would all be third degree 
felonies according to the statute, automatically become dwellings so long as a person 
actually stays there. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(l)(a). This argument completely 
eviscerates 76-6-201(l)(a)'s definition of building, which frequently references 
situations in which the structure has been adapted for people to live and stay in. 
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In addition, under the State's theory, a viaduct might qualify as a dwelling 
under the statute since homeless persons often sleep there. The State's definition of 
dwelling would also include a car, or an office, restaurant, or garage—so long as a 
person actually sleeps in the structure. However, the difference lies in the typical use of 
the structure. Dwellings are structures that people typically sleep in. The statute's 
definition of building includes buildings that people sleep in as well, but buildings are 
not structures typically used for sleeping. Similarly, churches are not buildings that are 
typically used for overnight accommodation. As such, the church in this case fits 
cleanly into the statute's definition of building—a structure which has been "adapted 
for overnight accommodation of persons," and consequently, remains a third degree 
felony under Utah law. Utah Code Ann, § 76-6-201(l)(a). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Francis asks this Court to find that the church does 
not qualify as a dwelling under Utah's burglary statute and find that the trial court 
erroneously convicted him of second degree burglary. 
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ADDDENDUM A 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201 
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76-6-201. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) (a) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any watercraft, aircraft, 
trailer, or other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or 
for carrying on business and includes: 
(i) each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or vehicle; and 
(ii) each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or vehicle, 
(b) "Building" does not include a railroad car. 
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging in the 
building at night, whether or not a person is actually present. 
(3) "Enter or remain unlawfully" means a person enters or remains in or on any 
premises when: 
(a) at the time of the entry or remaining, the premises or any portion of the premises 
are not open to the public; and 
(b) the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to enter or remain on the premises 
or any portion of the premises. 
(4) "Enter" means: 
(a) intrusion of any part of the body; or 
(b) intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor. 
(5) "Railroad car": 
(a) in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes a sleeping car or any container or 
trailer that is on a railroad car; and 
(b) includes only a railroad car that is operable and part of an ongoing railroad 
operation. 
Amended by Chapter 366, 2008 General Session 
3 
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ADDDENDUM B 
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February 8,2011 
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123 
THE COURT: Okay. Then, Ms. Mills, you go 
ahead. 
MS. MILLS: Your Honor, the Court has 
heard the testimony today by the witnesses that the 
State has presented. I think it's clear that 
Mr. Francis, we would agree and concede, that he was 
in the church without permission. He was found there 
and taken into custody there. 
I think the issues that the Court needs to 
address are, first and foremost, whether or not this 
church was a dwelling. 
Common law has said that buildings --
outbuildings on certain property enclosed in the same 
fence as a home are a dwelling, but I've been unable 
to find any current case law addressing this current 
situation, 
THE COURT: I don't have a case that 
addresses our fact pattern, but let me refer you to a 
case of State versus McCearny. 
MS. MILLS: I have that, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you? I'm looking down at 
what I think Lexis has deemed paragraph 9. This is 
the Court of Appeals commenting on the District 
Court's analysis. And the Court of Appeals says: We 
disagree with the District Court's conclusion that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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124 
Cox -- this is the case that the District Court 
relied upon -- made a structures type or the purpose 
for which it was built the determining factor in 
applying the dwelling definition. 
To the contrary, Cox spoke of the purpose 
for which the structure is used and whether the 
structure is, one, in which people typically stay 
overnight. 
Thus, the focus under Cox is on the actual 
use of the particular structure that is burglarized, 
not on the usual use of similar types of structures. 
And then they refer to a case of State 
versus Cates, parenthetically noting the holding that 
a camping trailer rented for the fall deer hunt was 
equipped for overnight lodging and was when rented 
and parked usually occupied by a person lodging 
therein at night. 
And so although Cox made it clear that 
continuous and current occupation is not needed, it 
did not address the particular fact situation. 
And I don't think that the facts either in 
McCearny or Cox are on point with the facts that we 
have in our case, but I think the language of actual 
use as opposed to usual use of similar types of 
structures is important to focus on. 
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With that said, what would you like me to 
consider with regard to McCearny? You said you're 
familiar with the opinion. So is your view that 
McCearny lends itself to this Court interpreting this 
structure as being a building rather than a dwelling? 
MS. MILLS: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And how is it that I reconcile 
that with the language contained here when the actual 
use of the church in this case was for someone to 
stay overnight? 
MS. MILLS: Your Honor, I think my view is 
that-we've heard testimony today that it is a church. 
That is its, you know, main use today. And I would 
just ask the Court to consider the fact that it is a 
church. It is not, you know, classified as a 
dwelling. Everyone refers to it as a church. 
The portion in which my client entered the 
building was the church portion. And I think I would 
just ask that you look at it as the use that it's 
really referred to as. 
THE COURT: What? The usual use --
MS. MILLS: Your Honor --
THE COURT: — or the actual use?. 
MS. MILLS: Your Honor, I would argue that 
the actual use of that building is a church. 
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THE COURT: Well, that's one of its uses 
certainly, but not the only use. 
MS. MILLS: I understand, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: So when we have these hybrid 
situations, what is your view in terms of which use 
trumps the other? I mean, if we have church services 
being held, I think the testimony was -- let me just 
flip back. I think there was testimony offered that 
services -- oh, goodness, I know I wrote it down. 
MS. MILLS: I believe services are held 
five to six days a week, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Tuesday, Wednesday, Friday, 
Saturday and Sunday,- and certainly not all day. 
MS. MILLS: Correct. 
THE COURT: You don't disagree with that. 
MS. MILLS: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, But we have an 
individual who resides there seven days a week all 
day. 
MS. MILLS: I understand, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: So if I'm comparing these 
uses, which use in your view would be the more -- and 
I'm not saying this is the right standard, because 
I'm-- again, I'm not getting into splitting hairs in 
terms of number of days and number of hours. But, I 
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mean, just to carry out your argument, if--- if it's 
being used more for overnight, more for dwelling, 
because Ms. Camacho's there all the time, and 
services only occur periodically throughout the week, 
which of those two uses do you view as being the more 
primary? 
MS. MILLS: Your Honor, I would concede 
that Ms. Camacho's residence would. 
THE COURT: Okay. Have you looked at also 
the definition contained in 76-6-201, sub 2, where 
the legislature has under the burglary statute 
specifically defined what a dwelling is? 
MS. MILLS: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Tell me what your view is of 
that definition as we talk about this dwelling issue. 
MS. MILLS: Your Honor, I understand 
that - - I think that the legislature under that 
definition would classify the church as a dwelling. 
And certainly the statute itself, as far as burglary 
is concerned, takes into account any portion of the 
building. 
Your Honor, as I stated, I don't think 
that we've had case law on this particular issue with 
these facts as we've heard them today, but I would 
ask the Court to look at the use -- the majority of 
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the building is used for church services and not for 
Ms. Camacho. While her residence is in the basement, 
Pastor Narvaez also stated that, you know, the 
majority of those rooms are also used for 
churchgoers. 
And I guess I would just rest with regard 
to that argument and continue, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Please. 
MS. MILLS: The next issue that I see 
is -- are the gloves that are allegedly found on 
Mr. Francis. There are no gloves in evidence that we 
can see, Your Honor, and it's disputed -- Officer 
Christensen testified that he wasn't sure if there 
had been, any gloves on Mr. Francis. 
The other witnesses, as far as Mr. -- or, 
excuse me, Pastor Narvaez and Officer Martin are 
concerned, yes, there were, we don't know what type. 
Your Honor, as I said, there's -- there's 
no argument as to whether or not my client was found 
in the building. I don't know that intent has been 
established with regard to why he was there. 
Under the statute, as the Court knows, the 
intent must be formed prior to entering the building. 
I would argue that intent for burglary of 
a dwelling, burglary of a building, and also criminal 
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trespass, which is a Class A misdemeanor, all contain 
that intent, you know, if it were to be something 
different beforehand, one just has to enter the 
building. 
I don't think that there is any solid 
evidence today that has shown that my client went in 
with the intent or formed it while he was there to 
steal anything. Nothing was stolen, nothing was 
missing, and nothing was found on his person. 
THE COURT: What would be the reasonable 
inference to draw from your client's presence in this 
particular structure at three in the morning wearing 
the clothing that was described in the area of the 
building that he was found in? What -- if I were to 
draw an inference, which I'm certainly entitled to 
do, albeit a reasonable inference, what would the 
reasonable inference be? 
MS. MILLS: Your Honor, first I would like 
to point out that the type of clothing that my client 
was wearing was never fully described and established 
and recalled. 
I think that there are also arguments to 
make, I'm not sure that it -- it does direct just to 
committing a burglary. 
I think presence in a church in the wee 
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hours of the morning, you know, is something that's 
possible in other churches that's appropriate. And I 
think that given the fact that, you know, Mr. Francis 
had attended this church on occasion and had been 
there as it was a church, there may not be any sort 
of inference with regard to him committing a theft or 
felony. 
THE COURT: Wouldn't that -- wouldn't that 
increase his knowledge or awareness if he's been to 
this particular church before, he would know that 
this is not a church where you can come in at all 
hours of the night to pray, for example, or seek 
refuge from bad weather? I mean, wouldn't he have a 
better understanding of the -- the church and how it 
operates? 
MS. MILLS: He would, Your Honor. And he 
certainly should. I don't think that that follows, 
though, that there is still that, inference that he 
intended to commit a felony or theft. I think it's 
also still possible -- and I'd like the Court to 
consider -- the lesser included offense of criminal 
trespass. 
THE COURT: Okay. What else? 
MS. MILLS: Your Honor, I think I would 
just close by asking, again, the Court to consider 
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any lesser included offenses based on the lack of 
intent that the State has shown today. 
And I would rest, Your Honor. Thank you. 
THE COURT: So let me just make sure I'm 
clear. Your - - your position is, first and foremost, 
I ought to be looking at this as a criminal trespass.. 
But if, in fact, I determine that there was some ill 
intent possessed by your client, then your secondary 
argument is I should view this as a building rather 
than as a dwelling and -- and find that worst case 
scenario for Mr. Francis this should be a 
third-degree felony rather than a second-degree 
felony; is that right? 
MS. MILLS: Yes, Your Honor. That's what 
I would ask 
THE COURT 
MS. MILLS 
THE COURT 
Okay. All right. Thank you. 
Thank you. 
Mr . Heward? 
MR. HEWARD: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Judge, initially in response before I go 
through the facts -- initially in response to 
Counsel's argument and the discussion that Your Honor 
engaged with her in regards to what constitutes -- or 
whether the church at 2324 Adams constitutes for our 
purposes as a dwelling. I'm glad that the Court 
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referred counsel to part 2 of the Utah Criminal Code 
76-6-201, sub 2. And I would suggest to. you, Your 
Honor, when you go through that meaning, which it 
says specifically: Dwelling means to a building 
which is usually occupied by a person lodging in the 
building at night whether or not the person is 
actually present. 
The reason that I don't think that Your 
Honor finds or defense counsel finds an exact fact 
pattern like this reported in the decisions in the 
State of Utah is because this definition makes it 
very clear on what a dwelling is. 
Applying that definition to the facts of 
this, there is no evidence that these are any way 
separated. It is a single building with entrances. 
You can see from the photographs that when 
you walk in the front door, you walk down the stairs 
to the basement level, which we've talked about, or 
you walk upstairs to the main level. There is no 
question that Lupe Camacho, in fact, resides there. 
She has a separate room with a door on it that locks. 
She has access to a kitchen. She has access to a 
bathroom. 
You can see the inside of her room is just 
that. It is her room. It has a desk. It has 
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chairs. It has a bed. It has clothing. It has 
everything indicating that that is, in fact -- and 
she testifies and there's evidence from Pastor as 
well, this is where she lives every single day. 
It is, as the statute says, a building 
which is usually occupied by a person lodging in the 
building at night. 
And I would suggest to you that if this --
has come up before, which it may well have -- that it 
is resolved by going to that definition, because I do 
believe it covers specifically what we're talking 
about. 
If you were to take the argument raised by 
counsel, I would suggest you could argue that to the 
absurdity. 
In other words, I could come to your home, 
I could enter at three a.m., and as long as I only 
entered into your living room then I wouldn't be 
committing a burglary of a dwelling because I'm not 
entering into the area where you were sleeping. And 
I think that, in essence, shows why this is 
unquestionably a dwelling for purposes of a 
second-degree felony. 
I — I have not had the benefit of reading 
the case that you cited to, Your Honor. And, 
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frankly, I didn't do that because it would be the 
State's position that the statute covers whether or 
not this is, in fact, a dwelling. 
Having -- having advanced that, Your 
Honor, this is a question -- again, as counsel says, 
there is no question that her client enters without 
permission. He enters at three a.m. He forcibly 
enters through one of the two windows. 
You have evidence before you that there 
were tools -- whether they were recovered by the 
police or not -- that were used for purposes — I 
think circumstantially -- to get into the windows. 
You can see by looking at the photographs, 
it is an older building. They are heavy, wood-framed 
windows; they are going to be somewhat difficult to 
open . 
You can also see from the photograph --
and the testimony was -- there was a damage to a 
window that was done. And you can see that -- where 
they are painted, there is actually new wood that has 
been splintered off that. 
THE COURT: Does that make a difference in 
terms of analyzing whether or not the entry was 
lawful or unlawful? 
MR. HEWARD: No, it doesn't. 
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THE COURT: I mean --
MR. HEWARD: Not at all . 
THE COURT: -- I'm just trying to 
understand - - I mean, I guess it makes it perhaps 
more egregious--
MR. HEWARD: Egregious. 
THE COURT: -- that it was a forced entry. 
But the reality is there's been no testimony that he 
was allowed to be there at that time of --
MR. HEWARD: The windows could have been 
open, the doors could have been unlocked and wide 
open, and it makes no difference whatsoever. 
What it does show, I think, Your Honor, is 
someone who goes through a certain amount of 
planning, someone who goes there with gloves on so 
that when he is opening these windows and they do 
splinter, the heavier gloves will keep his hands from 
picking those splinters up or getting cut and 
possibly leaving evidence behind. 
It also shows a certain amount of planning 
of someone who takes instruments with him for 
purposes of getting into that. The inference being 
this isn't just a spur of the moment thing. 
There is no evidence that, in fact, he 
walks by here and goes, oh, hey, why don't I go in 
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1 and go pray? There's no evidence from that, and I 
2 would suggest to you that's not a reasonable 
3 i nference to draw. 
4 He had been there repeatedly. He knew 
5 there were standard hours. He knew there were 
6 services that were provided.. He knew all of those 
7 things. 
8 And, Judge, he also knew several other 
9 things. He knew what was inside of the building. He 
10 knew that there were valuable instruments. He knew 
11 there were computers. He knew there were printers. 
12 He knew there was money. He knew all of those things 
13 because he'd previously been in that building and had 
14 an opportunity to see that. 
15 THE COURT: Perhaps that someone was 
16 residing downstairs as well. 
17 MR. HEWARD: Correct. I don't know what 
18 he knew or didn't know about whether or not Lupe 
19 Camacho resided there. 
20 I would suggest to you that if his intent 
21 was to get something to eat, which would still 
22 satisfy the intent to steal, that he would know that 
23 he would go to the lower level because that's the 
24 only place where a kitchen is located. There's no 
25 evidence that he did that, Judge. He specifically 
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stayed upstai rs. 
He specifically chose to go there at 
approximately, as Lupe testified, 2:20 a.m. It is 
about 30 to 40 minutes between the time that she 
says — and, again, I don't have any evidence that 
her cell phone is exactly correct, but she does 
testify she looks at it. And for about 30 to 40 
minutes he is inside of the church. She can hear him 
moving about. 
Again, we don't have evidence that he --
of what he was doing. I would suggest to you that he 
was doing a natural and logical inferences drawn from 
that. He was looking for the items. He was casing 
the place. He was deciding what it was he was going 
to take and how he was going to get it out of there. 
There is direct evidence before Your Honor 
on certain of the elements and there is 
circumstantial evidence before you on other ones, 
specifically what was his intent. 
Again, we pointed out through the pastor 
that he had had an issue before in which money had 
come up missing. He had had times when he had been 
at the church and knew what was there for the 
purposes of taking. 
If he wanted food, he knew that he could 
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go there when it was open. If he wanted solace, he 
knew that he could go there when it was open. 
Judge, individuals who are out at three 
a.m. at any location opening windows which are closed 
and they're having to use some form of a tool are 
showing to you that they are going to do whatever is 
necessary for purposes of getting into that 
particular location. 
His motives are not good. His motives are 
not honest. His motives are exactly what they speak. 
The middle of the night, a heavy coat on. 
Why does he have a heavy coat on? Does he have a 
heavy coat on perhaps so that in the event while he's 
going through the -- the window that he's pried open 
he doesn't again end up getting cut? Don't know. 
But he doesn't have a coat on because it's cold 
outside. 
Does he have a heavy coat on so that he 
can perhaps hide things underneath it as he's leaving 
and moving to another location? I would suggest that 
is a possibility. 
Why does he have gloves on? And -- and 
you asked the question, what is the significance, 
Officer, of the heavy gloves versus the latex gloves? 
And the officer testified very specifically, his 
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experience was heavy gloves for purposes of not 
getting injured while they're getting in; latex 
gloves for purposes of handling things and not 
leaving fingerprints behind. 
We would suggest that when you look at the 
facts that the Court has, draw the natural and 
logical inferences, Your Honor, this defendant did 
enter a dwelling with the intent to commit a theft. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Ms. Mills, anything - - I guess - - I guess, 
Mr. Heward, it threw me off that you reserved. 
Usually he would go first, then you, and then he 
again. But we went out of order that way, so --
All right. Mr. Francis, let me -- let me 
summarize for you the findings that I have made as 
I've listened to the testimony. 
The Court heard from three witnesses: 
Lupe Camacho, who identified herself and who has been 
identified as the caretaker of this particular church 
located at 2324 Adams Avenue here in Ogden. 
The Court heard from Pastor Narvaez, who 
was the State's second witness and who described 
being called to the church in the early morning hours 
by Ms. Camacho when she felt that an intruder had 
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come into the building. 
The Court heard from Officer Zachary 
Martin, and also from Officer Clint Chri st'ensen. 
I don't think, based on the evidence 
that's been presented — and as, Ms. Mills, you 
conceded -- there's any doubt in the Court's mind 
that Mr. Francis was inside this particular structure 
in the early morning hours back in June of 2010, 
specifically June 25th of 2010. 
There's been no testimony that provides 
the Court with any basis upon which to conclude that 
Mr. Francis's presence in the church was authorized 
by anyone. 
In fact, the testimony has been that the 
church was locked. Ms. Camacho testified that she 
locks it routinely every night, both windows and 
doors, and recalls following that protocol or pattern 
on the day in question. 
There's been no evidence presented that 
the defendant, Mr. Francis,obtained verbal 
permission from anybody to be in the church for any 
reason other than during ordinary business hours or 
church service hours. 
I think most significantly to the Court, 
in terms of all the evidence that has been presented, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
141 
is the condition that Mr. Francis was found in at the 
time he was located and placed under arrest. 
The reason the Court asked Officer Martin 
about the gloves particularly is because in the 
Court's view it would not be unusual for an 
individual, especially if the individual was someone 
who didn't have a place to keep his personal 
belongings, to walk around with coats and gloves and 
other things because of an inability to keep those 
things somewhere safe. 
And so initially, although the Court finds 
it incredibly unusual and odd that in June 
Mr. Francis would have both a coat on and gloves, it 
was in the early morning hours, although the officer 
testified that it was not cold, and, in fact, he did 
not have a coat on. 
But the gloves that the Court finds 
significant are the latex gloves that were retrieved 
from Mr. Francis. Apparently there were several sets 
of those latex gloves. And initially the Court had 
some questions in its mind about the significance of 
those gloves. 
Officer Martin testified, based on his 
extensive training and experience in participating in 
the investigations involving burglaries and/or 
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1 thefts, that latex gloves were significant to him 
2 because they are the type of glove that an individual 
3 would use to pick through items and -- and be able 
4 to — to do so without leaving any fingerprints 
5 behind, and that a bulkier, thicker glove would be a 
6 glove commonly used by an individual seeking entry 
7 into a structure to -- to prevent either damage to 
8 that individual's hands, or because of the need to 
9 use tools or instruments that would be easier to use 
10 ' with thicker, more padded gloves. 
11 There's been really no description of what 
12 those gloves looked like, other than they were black, 
13 so I really don't even know that they were thicker in 
14 terms of the latex gloves. But I think it is 
15 significant that they were different than the gloves 
16 found on Mr. Francis's persons, specifically in his 
17 pant - - pant pockets. 
18 I think Mr. Heward is correct when he says 
19 it really doesn't matter what Mr. Francis was there 
20 to take, if, in fact, I find that he was there to 
21 take something. It could have been food. It could 
22 have been money. It could have been a computer. It 
23 could have been donations. It could have been an 
24 additional set of clothing that he could have just as 
25 easily gone in during the morning or afternoon hours 
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and asked to be provided by the pastor. But the 
point is is that whatever it was that he was there to 
take, he was taking without permission, and that 
makes the taking unauthorized. 
So then the question becomes, as Ms. Mills 
has suggested, is it fair -- is it reasonable to --
to conclude or draw the inference, Mr. Francis, that 
you were there to take something rather than there 
for some other reason? And in that regard, I suppose 
it could be argued that there are a variety of other 
reasons why you were there. 
Perhaps just to give some illustrations, 
you could have been there to use the restroom, or you 
could have been there because you needed shelter. 
There are a lot of other scenarios. 
But in this particular case, what tilts 
the Court in favor of drawing a reasonable inference 
that you were there with ill motives to take 
something, to steal, is the fact that you had these 
latex gloves on you, and there's been testimony that 
there were some tools found that were left at the 
scene that were brought to gain access, which would 
suggest that the decision to make entry was made in 
advance, not a spur of the moment, I'm passing by the 
church and I really need to use the restroom, I'll 
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see if the window's open, climb in, use the restroom 
and then leave. 
The presence of tools, the presence of the 
latex gloves, would suggest to this Court that this 
was something that was planned rather than something 
that was just spontaneously occurring as you happened 
by the -- the church in the early morning hours of 
June 25th. 
That then takes the Court to the next part 
of the analysis, and that is whether or not this 
structure should be characterized as a building or a 
dwelling. And I think that both the language 
contained in McCearny and the language contained in 
the statute itself offer clear support for the 
Court's conclusion that while this building was, in 
fact, a building used for church-related functions, 
meals, church services, donations and other events, 
there is no question that this is also a building 
which is -- as the statute says -- usually occupied 
by a person lodging in the building at night. 
And I think the testimony is.-- is 
uncontroverted that Ms. Camacho has been living in 
the building for some time, has been serving as the 
caretaker, has her own separate bedroom, and is 
allowed -- or uses the bathroom that's downstairs, is 
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1 also authorized -- also uses the kitchen area 
2 downstairs as her own personal kitchen. 
3 I think that was --it was interesting to 
4 the Court -- and certainly this isn't a legal 
5 opinion, but I thought it was interesting -- that 
6 Pastor Narvaez said during his testimony that he 
7 considered this to be Lupe's home, that that's how he 
8 views it, as opposed to she's just renting a room or 
•9 something of that nature, that he characterized this 
10 as her home. And I think that the testimony that has 
11 been provided suggests to the Court that this, in 
12 fact, was a dwelling, as that term is defined under 
13 76-6-201, sub 2. 
14 With this being a dwelling and with the 
15 Court drawing the reasonable inference that 
16 Mr. Francis was in the building at 3:00 in the 
17 morning for -- in order to or with intent to commit, 
18 in the Court's view, a theft, based on the condition 
19 he was found in, the Court would find that the State 
20 has met its burden beyond a reasonable doubt and 
21 would find the defendant guilty of burglary, a 
22 second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
23 Annotated 76-6-202. 
24 Now, with that said, Ms. Mills, I would be 
25 inclined, unless you have a different suggestion, to 
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